When I was a young Lieutenant the year before 9/11, trying to figure it out in the army, I found myself in a bit of a predicament at a training exercise. I was a Cavalry Scout Recce Platoon Leader in the newly formed but not yet named Stryker Brigade. (The initial and official nomenclature was the IBCT, “Interim” Brigade Combat Team.) The IBCT/Stryker BDE was formed largely due to the disastrous Operation Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu Somalia years earlier known among the general populace as Blackhawk Down or to many Service Members simply as “Mog”.
The Stryker BDE would attempt to (among many other things) make battlefield decisions much quicker and hopefully clearer for the “Soldier on the ground” by powering down assets and thus increasing technological prowess at the lowest level possible. This meant that Lieutenants and Captains could now access and utilize certain technologies previously controlled at the General Officer level. It was a big deal. There was a lot of national attention being paid to our IBCT because the intent was to eventually transform the entire army around this concept. A Stryker BDE would theoretically be able to deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours. None of us knew that a major war was on the horizon. We were just training. And getting a whole lot of attention from the national media and Congress.
The manner in which the Stryker BDE was conceptualized and being stood up (at that time) was completely different from what the US Military was accustomed to. The normal way of doing business was to purchase new weapons or technologies from a manufacturer, and then figure out how to deploy them and use them in the most effective manner. Now, we were reversing the process. Our job at the IBCT was to help a group of planners rewrite the tactical manual based on mission requirements while simultaneously determining what types of technologies would be best to complete the mission with those tactics. The Department of Defense would eventually tell the developers what we needed and expect them to manufacture it. This made perfect sense to young me. But, technology alone would not solve every problem. There was a human element at play. What would a young lieutenant with little experience do with such assets and authority in a high-stress situation? Which brings me back to my predicament.
The Fog of War always persists. There is probably no more appropriate metaphor for any military situation in the history of warfare. Good training exercises simulate the Fog of War as much as possible. And since we were training in response to Mog/Blackhawk Down, the Fog was carefully cultivated to create stressful decision points with social implications in a morally ambiguous environment in the midst of live media coverage.
So, here I was with my RECCE (Scout) Platoon. My mission was to go into a town and gather some information to report to my superiors. Fort Lewis at this time had a simulated town called Regensburg where we could train in an urban environment. Regensburg consisted of several buildings in a clearing in the middle of the “backyard” (This is what we called the densely wooded area of Fort Lewis where most field training was conducted). The buildings could be modified/occupied in various ways to simulate a host of situations and there was usually a group of characters (Soldiers) doing their best to simulate a genuine populace that would be found in the given area. The version of Regensburg we were entering had a Mosque, a Red Cross/Red Crescent, a government building that housed the town Mayor, a market, and a few other buildings that I do not remember.
I had a black list of known terrorists/enemies, a gray list of known associates or sketchy characters, and a white list of friendlies. Our mission was to camp outside the town and monitor any comings and goings, then go into the town and make contact with the mayor. We needed to find out if anyone on the black list was in or near the town. Pretty simple.
Not so much.
After a few hours of really smooth movement and intelligence gathering, we decided it was time to approach the Mayor. I took a squad-sized element with everyone I felt was necessary for the task. I left a Quick Reaction Force right outside the town with appropriate instructions. My Platoon Sergeant stayed in our “camp” with the rest of the platoon ready to provide whatever assistance may be necessary. The mayor was outside the government building chatting with a group of citizens. As we approached, we were hit by a sniper in the middle of the town square. One of my Soldiers was severely injured and the mayor had been hit as well.
Whoever came up with this scenario was pretty clever. Three of the four buildings surrounding us presented an ethical dilemma. We were in the shadows of a Mosque, a government building, and the Red Cross. Of-course, this was the point of the exercise. The Fog of War was thick in every respect.
Let me cut to the chase. After finding cover and initiating medical care, we determined that the sniper was inside the Red Cross. The way we had been trained was that medical facilities were similar to churches in that they were a place void of violence. They treated any and all people with the same level of compassion. They were essentially like a sanctuary.
We needed to eliminate the threat. But, entering the Red Cross/sanctuary could be seen as crossing an ethical line. I decided to do it anyway. We were hunting a terrorist, not a shoplifter. We made our way to a door of the building and requested to enter. We were denied. There was some back and forth then I decided to force our way into the Red Cross. The “Civilians” inside tried to block us. We shoved them out of the way forcefully, entered, and began room clearing.
We did not find the sniper. He was not in the building. At some point soon thereafter the OC (Observer Controller), which is essentially an evaluator, called EndEx (End Execution). The exercise was over (before we were able to find the sniper). And we headed to the debriefing tent for our After Action Review (AAR).
As I remember it, I think I was a little pissed. I felt like I had been handed a Kobayashi Maru. Regardless, the AAR went pretty smoothly considering. The OC and other observers did not know what they would have done in the same situation and really did not criticize my decision to enter the Red Cross. They of course still pointed out, rightfully so, that I had made some unforced errors and reminded me that there was Media on the Battlefield (MOB). The headlines for the next morning would read “American Military Raids Red Cross”.
SIDE NOTE: Several years later during a different training event before I deployed to Iraq, I argued to a group of my peers, a few of whom were completely horrified, that Media on the Battlefield should not be briefed in the Friendly Forces portion of the Situation Paragraph of an Operations Order. I argued that the media were, in fact, not our friends. They were not our enemy but they were definitely not our friends. They should be regarded similarly to an obstacle or the weather, something we had to always consider, could not control, and could potentially hinder, help, or have no effect on a given operation. Seems obvious.
The reason this entire memory came to mind is due to the widespread media attention of the Hamas Headquarters under/in the basement of Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. As the article below( which someone loaded up on Substack the other day) depicts, the bunker under the hospital has been there for well over 10 years. The media has known about it, has known that Hamas has roamed the halls of the hospital with weapons, and has known that Hamas has used the patients of the hospital as human shields.
And in a bit of irony, I learned during our AAR that our sniper from that training event in 2000, who was not inside the Red Cross, was actually under it.
Accepted Thoughts 
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